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The Identity Thief: How Politics, Religion, and Values Stole Support for Sexual Assault Reporting and the #MeToo Movement

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ABSTRACT AND ARTICLE INFORMATION

In 2017, the hashtag #MeToo emerged as a sign of protest and solidarity challenging the status quo of sexual assault underreporting. Over the next year, reported cases of sexual assault increased by 86.5% (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014–2018). As it began, #MeToo experienced broad support from across American society. Inflection points have tested this support, as for example, in Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony before congress (Wright et al., 2021). In an increasingly polarized era, we examine the role that self-reported political identity, participation with a religious community, and value-identities of *Conformity, Security, and Tradition* play in shaping attitudes about sexual assault reporting and the #MeToo movement. Our findings suggest that religiosity and political identity is complexly correlated with the increasingly politicized #MeToo movement. We also find that support for sexual assault reporting and the #MeToo moment gets filtered through value-identities of *Conformity, Security, and Tradition* with the aggregate effect stifling support. We conclude that identities shaped by conservative politics, androcentric religious traditions, and values oriented toward *Conformity, Security, and Tradition* serve as foundational social psychological factors needing additional attention, as emerging research investigates the potential for movements increasingly defined by identity divisions, for example, rising Christian Nationalism and related protests.

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On October 15, 2017, Alyssa Milano posted the following message to Twitter:

Figure 1: October 15, 2017 #MeToo Post by Alyssa Milano



In a little over 12 hours, more than half a million people had posted #MeToo in response. Within a week, #MeToo was a “viral trend.” A year later, more than 19 million posts of #MeToo had been shared across social media (see Mendes et al., 2018, for a full historical accounting of #MeToo trending on social media). The phrase “#MeToo” originated with Tarana Burke in 2006 on the social media platform Myspace (Bhattacharyya, 2018). Burke’s use of the phrase was an effort to protest the history of sexual assault and abuse faced by women of color—it is important to note that underrepresentation of women of color within the movement continues even in the era of #MeToo (Emejulu, 2018; Onwuachi-Willig, 2018; Pellegrini, 2018). Milano’s post, in part a reaction to the sexual abuse allegations brought at the time against Harvey Weinstein, propelled and popularized the use of the phrase “#MeToo.”

Resurgence of “Me Too” as the hashtag #MeToo catalyzed a platform, empowering victims to stand together in protest against a system reluctant to hold abusers accountable as well as to disclose incidents of sexual assault not previously reported (Levy & Mattsson, 2019). Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS; 2014-2018) data show that reported cases of sexual assault went from 393,979 in 2017 to 734,632 in 2018, an increase of 86.5%. On the surface, it seems that #MeToo has successfully created a space for

disclosure, providing victims with the confidence to speak out (Aggarwal & Brenner, 2019).

According to the BJS (2014-2018) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), one out of every six women in the U.S. has been the victim of an attempted or completed sexual assault in their lifetime (14.8% completed, 2.8% attempted). With more than 165 million women/girls in the U.S., based on BJS numbers, sexual assault reporting should be around 27,642,272 lifetime cases, a far cry from current numbers. Despite a growing number of reports spurred by #MeToo, reporting accounts for less than 0.003% of sexual assault. Further, in the U.S., according to the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network (RAINN; 2020), fewer than 10% of *reported* cases of sexual assault result in a conviction of a perpetrator.

Initially, support for increased awareness around issues of sexual assault reporting spurred by #MeToo was not driven by identity politics (see Clark & Evans, 2020), and despite the history of victimization experienced by women at the outset, support of the movement was not explicitly tied to sex or gender identification (Costa et al., 2020; Wright et al., 2021). Support cut across class, gender, race, religious, SES, and sex differences. Less than five years on from Milano’s post, emerging research suggests that identity politics (Holman & Kalmoe, 2021), religious beliefs (Cassese, 2020), and sex differences (Hansen & Dolan, 2020) influence support for #MeToo while simultaneously catalyzing support for movements informed by conservative androcentric religious contexts, such as Christian Nationalism (see Campbell et al., 2018). Given contemporary polarization and politicization, we wonder how a person’s self-reported participation with a religious tradition coupled with political identification along a liberal versus conservative continuum fosters a social psychological condition where emergent value-identities impact attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting and the distinctly politicized #MeToo movement.

To test this question, we gathered data in 2020 from a national sample of U.S. respondents analyzing multiple modeling strategies looking at both direct and indirect effects of religious participation, identity politics, and the social psychological construction of value-identities predicting people’s attitudes related to 1) sexual assault reporting and 2) the #MeToo movement. A key contribution of the work we present here is in the tying of threads between the movements’ literature largely coming out of political science to the social psychology of value-identities. Whereas previous work in this area incorporates a psychologically informed social psychology, we investigate these cleavages and linkages by adopting a sociological social psychology

framework (for more on the significance of this distinction, see Gecas, 2000). Too, as Klar and McCoy (2021) note, support for #MeToo began with “virtue signaling” from a broad intersection of groups but has recently aligned along politically charged identity boundaries requiring a more nuanced perspective on how these dynamics evolve (for more see Cassese, 2020; Holman & Kalmoe, 2021).

Literature Review

How Politics and Religion Impact Support

Scholars have long debated about the impact politics and religion have on a person’s involvement with and support of a given social movement (Hannigan, 1991; Peek et al., 1997; Snow & Beyerlein, 2019). With nonsectarian/nontheism the largest, and growing, self-reported “religious” affiliation (see Norpoth, 2020), it may seem unnecessary to consider the effect religion has on, well, anything. Despite increasing numbers of self-reported religious “Nones,” when surveyed broadly, the Pew Research Center (2014) found that 77% of Americans report that religion is “somewhat or very important in one’s life” with 69% reporting attendance at church meetings over the course of a year. The continued influence of religion in American culture is magnified when overlapped with our other primary predictor of interest, political identity. Among the members of the 117th Congress, 88%, nearly nine-in-ten, report affiliation with a Christian religious tradition. Additionally, half of Americans say that the Bible should inform how lawmakers govern, with 28% reporting that biblical teachings should be given preference over “the will of the people” (Fahmy, 2020, p. 1).

Religious institutions continue to maintain a prominent role in America, shaping socialization experiences across the life-course for both mass and elite religiosity. For instance, Putnam and Campbell (2010) find that, on average, Americans with high levels of church attendance report being happier, nicer, more giving in terms of charitable donations, more engaged in the civic processes of government, and generally express higher levels of trust and trustworthiness. They also found that involvement with a religious community positively correlates with greater life satisfaction (see also McCaffree & Saide, 2017)

Putnam and Campbell’s (2010) findings hold across demographic groups and denominations. Despite the positives, they go on to report that pro-social outcomes are tied to social networks, rather than being connected *specifically* to a theology. In fact, when controlling for the individual level positive

effects of belief, Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that participation with a religious group correlates with less tolerance of others, less engagement in civic discourse, and meaner attitudes and treatment of members of perceived out-groups. These results support the work of Allport (see Allport & Ross, 1967) who found that differing levels of “religious maturity” among believers predicts an inward focused, or intrinsic religious orientation versus an outward focused, or extrinsic religious orientation (for more, see Tiliopoulos et al., 2007).

Questions about the extent of the “othering” effects of religious participation have been the subject of numerous studies (see Djupe & Calfano, 2012; Porter, 2010; Smidt & Penning, 1982). Stewart and colleagues (2018) found that Americans who express high levels of religious participation also report overwhelmingly negative attitudes toward out-groups and a general feeling of political intolerance for ideas and values considered outside the norms of their group. Across the literature, results suggest that participants are simultaneously nicer *and* meaner, with much stronger evidence of pro-social attitudes and behavior directed at in-group members. For example, Americans who self-identify as Christian tend to report that they do not like people from other traditions (Rhodes, 2012; Schwadel & Garneau, 2018), privileging Christian theology as the guide informing the creation of public policy/law (Djupe & Calfano, 2013).

In a meta-analysis of 55 independent studies looking at “social cognitive religious motives” of self-reported religious people, with a total of 22,075 study participants, Hall and colleagues (2010) connected religious participation to values of conformity and tradition and the role these values play in shaping people’s perceptions of perceived out-group others:

Values of social conformity and respect for tradition that motivated devotion to religious practice also motivated the acceptance of established...divisions in society. Although religious people might be expected to express humanitarian acceptance of others, their humanitarianism is expressed primarily toward in-group members (Hall et al., 2010, p. 134).

Combining the tendency of religious socialization to “otherize” people with an increasingly polarized electorate creates fertile ground for divisions to arise and for those divisions to result in conflict, even violent conflict (Finkel et al., 2020; Kane et al., 2021; Margolis, 2018). An example of this is found in

the emerging scholarship on so-called Christian Nationalism. Rather than being an indicator of personal belief or even expectations about the religiosity of other individuals, Christian Nationalism is informed by conservative Christian religion within society more broadly and especially conservative ideals about the state (Whitehead & Perry 2020). Whitehead and Perry (2020) identify Christian Nationalism as the single greatest factor shaping “traditional” patriarchal gender ideology, with their findings robust to a range of relevant controls across a full scope of Christian denominational diversity (see also Todd et al., 2020). Critically, these normative and aspirational orientations are independent of personal religious belief, belonging, and behavior, even among conservative Christians. It is often pointed out that after controlling for measures of Christian Nationalism, the frequency of religious service attendance even among Evangelical Christians is negatively correlated with the racial and political conservatism that has been the subject of much of the research (Whitehead et al., 2018).

We mention social movements related to so-called Christian Nationalists to exemplify intersectional spaces shaped by identity politics and androcentric religiosity triggering divisions in which members of a movement perceive that their religious and social order is under threat and in decline, despite mass and elite structures of power suggesting otherwise (Whitehead et al., 2018). In concert with gender, political identity, and religious measures, Christian Nationalist ideology animates a broad range of social and political attitudes including attitudes about gun rights (Whitehead et al., 2018), interracial marriage (Perry & Whitehead, 2015; Whitehead & Perry, 2015), pandemic policy (Perry et al., 2020), anti-gay/LGBTQ+ movements (Whitehead & Perry, 2019), and opposition of science (Baker et al., 2020). In aggregate, findings of Perry and Whitehead (2019) suggest that those expressing higher support for Christian Nationalism are more likely to resist expansions of rights to minoritized groups across a broad range of issues (Whitehead et al., 2016). While our work here does not test Christian Nationalism directly, we see considerable overlap between our emphasis on the social psychological conditions leading to value-identities defined by conformity, security, and tradition and the work of Whitehead and Perry, especially given that both act as antecedent influences connecting religious participation and conservative-oriented political ideology.

The Role of Patriarchy

Our definition of androcentrism emphasizes that religious socialization has a profound impact on the development of values and identities at the society

as well as individual level (see Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). For instance, patriarchal religious traditions perpetuate a value of silence around issues related to sex (Flood & Pease, 2009). Houston-Kolnik and colleagues (2019) note that congregants take cues from male religious leaders who often perpetuate what they call a “holy hush, or a general silence about and inaction regarding” (p. 2) things such as sexual assault.

Androcentric orientations to gender create an atmosphere in which victims are reluctant to upset core values of conformity, security, and tradition (Horton & Williamson, 1988; Nason-Clark, 2001). For example, Knickmeyer and colleagues (2010) find that when women believe that their intimate partner is perceived to be a “good Christian man,” it makes it essentially impossible for them to report abuse. Abusers also use religious texts and teachings to support the “holy hush” (Moder, 2019; Troftgruben, 2018). Patriarchal stigmatization of reporting silences abuses against women (King & Beattie, 2005), minority racial groups (Blumenfeld et al., 2009), and the LGBTQ+ community (Clarke et al., 1989).

Religiosity and Political Identity

Increasingly, political orientation—what we are calling “political identity” as an ideological distinction that is markedly distinct from explicit partisanship—is a key source of meaning shaping a person’s identity (see Masuoka & Junn, 2013) and, by extension, affecting a person’s commitment to and participation with the civic process, social movements/protest, and other members of the community (Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2018). Analog to the divisions between the religious and non-religious (see Cassese, 2019; Fukuyama, 2018; Schwadel & Garneau, 2018), intolerance between self-reported conservatives and liberals decreases civil discourse and political cooperation (Eisenstein et al., 2017; Mason & Wronski, 2018). The identity gap between the religious and politically conservative and the non-religious and politically liberal widens these cleavages (Egan, 2020).¹

From Values to Identities

Our review of the literature to this point would be incomplete without a discussion of value-identities; in fact, our inclusion of value-identities as a sociological concept is a key contribution of this paper. Androcentric religious contexts intersecting with a politics rooted in conservatism combine to create values defined by conformity, security, and tradition (Delehanty et al., 2018). Values are “those conceptions of desirable states of affairs that are used as criteria of evaluation” (R. M. Williams, 1968, 2016, p. 23). Identities based on values are “internalized

[value] expectations [shaped by] social relationships” (Stryker, 2007, p. 1084). Across the life-course, value meanings emerge through social experience, for instance, through participation with a religious tradition or political group. The likelihood that a given value-identity will motivate behavior is based on four factors: first, the underlying meanings shaping the value (Schwartz, 1992); second, the relative commitment a person has to this value-identity (Merolla et al., 2012); third, the importance (often called prominence) of the value-identity (Brenner et al., 2018; Morris, 2013); and finally, the relative salience of the value-identity (Morris, 2012; Sagiv et al., 2017). When a person clearly defines a value meaning, is highly committed to it, and considers it an important part of the self, the salience of the value-identity acts as a master status guiding other aspects of the self (Stets, 2010). Aldecoa (2019) uses the term moral identity to describe this process: “The moral identity is a higher-order or ‘principal level’ identity [;] it can be conceptualized as guiding the meanings of lower-order or ‘program level’ identities” (p. 123). Despite misleading results from some early research on the value-behavior linkage, emerging research on this linkage finds that committed, important, and highly salient value-identities influence behavioral choices (Lee et al., 2021).

Put another way, value-identities have a trans-situational quality, moving with a person across situations. Value-identities motivate behavior by setting a criterion for what is and is not acceptable behavior across diverse conditions (Morris, 2019). The trans-situational nature of value-identities tempts some to group value-based-identities into a category called “person identity” (see Stets et al., 2020). In time, this may prove to be a useful catchall; ultimately, we view this a distinction of degree rather than a difference of kind. For our purposes, we prefer the term *value-identity* (Gecas, 2008).

In the case of the current study, we are arguing that across the life-course, a person learns a variety of value meanings shaped by religious and political contexts, becomes variously committed to them, considering them important, in turn forming value-identities that are relative in their ability to be salient as predictors of attitudes and behavior. Accordingly, values act as a precursor to participation with social action (Morris & LeCount, 2020). Behaving in accordance with one’s value-identities also results in affirmation and strengthening of those value-identities, creating a positive feedback loop in which value-identity behavior feeds the underlying value(s) forming the identity (Stets, 2016; Stets & Carter, 2011, 2012).

Previous research on the relationships under investigation in this study make use of psychologically

oriented “social identity theory.” To our knowledge, this is the first study to incorporate sociological oriented social psychology to test the identity related concepts under examination. Our emphasis on *meanings* leads us to focus on ideology, that is, identity politics as opposed to party affiliation per se. Our work here explicitly picks up where Gecas (2008) left off (see also Aldecoa, 2019; Donahue & Miller, 2006; Stets & McCaffree, 2019) suggesting that value-identities move across situations influencing individual behavior. In the case of this study, that movement occurs through a network of value-identity linkages stemming from conservative and androcentric meanings. As such, given the religious and political conditions shaping value-identities oriented towards conformity, security, and tradition, these values will negatively predict attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo. To further examine the relationship between value-identities and support, we include a test of value-identities oriented toward benevolence and universalism, hypothesizing that these value-identities will positively predict attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo (see also Gecas, 2000). Our Method section includes further discussion of each of the variables that we include during our analyses including an explanation for why conformity, security, and tradition is juxtaposed against benevolence and universalism. Use of italics that follows indicates a measured variable rather than a theoretical concept.

Hypotheses

H¹: *Church Attendance* and *Conservative* political identity will positively correlate with the value-identities of *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition*.

H²: Respondents who report stronger *Conservative* political identity will negatively correlate with attitudes about *Sexual Assault* reporting and #MeToo.

H³: As *Church Attendance* increases, attitudes of support for *Sexual Assault* reporting and #MeToo will decrease.

H⁴: As respondent’s self-reported identification with value-identities of *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition* increase, support for *Sexual Assault* reporting and #MeToo will decrease, whereas value-identities oriented toward *Benevolence* and *Universalism* will increase attitudes of support for Sexual Assault reporting and #MeToo.

Method

Data

Prior to data gathering, we obtained IRB approval and conducted a pilot study to test our instrument. Following IRB approval of our study, participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in the U.S. All respondents, also known as “Turkers,” were paid at or above the federal minimum wage based on a pilot study and deliberation about speed vs. reliability of data. Pilot work and our study of the literature on paid survey work determined payment for survey completion (for more on this point, see Mao et al., 2013). We feel it important to note these details of the study because though MTurk surveys have been shown to be adequately representative and reliable as sources of data (see Levay et al., 2016; Mullinix et al., 2015; Paolacci et al., 2010), Turkers time/pay have been taken advantage of (see Martin et al., 2014).² A total *N* of 1,380 valid responses were recorded from across the U.S. In a few cases, technical problems required a handful of responses to be discarded.

Two dependent variables were used as outcomes in the current study, the first question generalized to sexual assault and the second to the protest-oriented topic of #MeToo. The first question reads, “Accusations of sexual assault are accepted too easily in our current society.” The second question reads, “The #MeToo movement and related protests makes it too easy for sexual assault accusations to be made.” Categorical options were coded from 1-7: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree/Undecided, Disagree, Strongly disagree, Don’t Know, and Refuse to Answer.

Our measure of political ideology borrows from common phrasing and adds a qualifier to account for political interest, “Even if you don’t consider yourself to be a ‘political person’ please make your best guess. When it comes to political matters, would you say that you are more liberal or more conservative?” Response options range from 1-7: Very liberal, Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, Very Conservative, Don’t Know, Refuse to Answer. Numeric increase reflects increasing conservatism.³

Considerable debate exists about how to measure religiosity; that is, is it a matter of belief or attendance (Wimberley, 1989)? Given our emphasis here on behavior related to identity processes, we rely on self-reports of attendance at worship services (for more on this point, see Brenner, 2011a, 2011b, 2016). Our question reads, “How frequently do you attend religious services/activities?” Response options coded from 1-9: Daily, 2-3 times a week, Once a week, 2-3 times a month, Once a month, A few times a year

and/or on religious holiday, Never, Don’t know, Refuse to Answer. A numeric increase reflects increasing self-reported church attendance.

Value-identities were measured using the Twenty Item Value Inventory (TIVI) by Sandy and colleagues (2017). TIVI measures are multi-item scales, with higher scores indicating greater identification with the value domain. Confirmatory factor analysis of our items statistically significantly replicated the constructs and basic structure of values in our data (see Schwartz, 1992, for more). The Schwartz value structure has a spatial organization of value-identity domains, with those values arranged opposite one another considered an inverse pair (e.g., conformity vs. hedonism; Schwartz et al., 2012). With respect to our primary domains of interest, Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 2012) operationalize their measure of *Conformity* as “restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms;” of *Security* as “deriv[ing] from basic individual and group requirements...to a significant degree, the goal of security for self [and] those with whom one identifies;” and of *Tradition* as “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one’s culture or religion provides” (pp. 5-6). Additional quotation from Schwartz will help clarify our juxtaposition; *Benevolence* is operationalized as

voluntary concern for others’ welfare (helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, loyal, true friendship, mature love) [sense of belonging, meaning in life, a spiritual life]. Benevolence and conformity values both promote cooperative and supportive social relations. However, benevolence values provide an internalized motivational base for such behavior. In contrast, conformity values promote cooperation in order to avoid negative outcomes for self. (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 7)

Universalism is operationalized as “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.... People do not recognize these needs until they encounter others beyond the extended primary group” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 7). These latter two value domains contain the possibility of awareness extending beyond the individual, with value-identities informed by meanings oriented toward transcendence beyond in-group dynamics. Despite our a priori hypotheses juxtaposing values oriented toward

Conformity, Security, and Tradition against *Benevolence* and *Universalism*, we began our analysis with all 10 value domains identified by Schwartz and colleagues (2012). This allowed for a full accounting of all value domains emergent in our data.

Based on several studies demonstrating a link between sex and support for #MeToo (see Kunst et al., 2019), we included a binary measure of self-reported Sex, 0 = Male, and 1 = Female. While we acknowledge that it is plausible that the effects of non-binary gender identity likely impact perspectives on the movement, the very small number of persons who identified within the non-binary (< 1%) in our sample makes distinct analysis of such effects non-viable. We also include a measure for a respondent's willingness to question their religious tradition called *Doubt*, a tendency that divides conservative Christians from other members of society (Whitehead & Perry, 2020). We included a measure for a person's religious affiliation with the following 15 options: Catholic (incl. Roman Catholic and Orthodox), Protestant (United Church, Anglican, Orthodox, Baptist, Lutheran), Christian Orthodox, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon), Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Other, not listed, Atheist (do not believe in God), Agnostic (not sure if there is a God), Nothing in particular (Non).⁴

We have also included dummied variables for *Protestant* and *White Protestant* based on research finding particularly acute anti-liberal-protest sentiments among White Protestants (Whitehead & Perry, 2020). Additionally, based on prior research (see Jacques-Tiura et al., 2010), we include controls for *Age*, *Education*, *Race* and *Income* and a dummied variable isolating *White* respondents. Also included is a variable using respondents' zip code locating them in states of the former Confederacy, coded *South*, 0 = Not from South, and 1 = From the South. This variable was included as it remains both the most politically and religiously conservative region of the U.S. (Moore & Vanneman, 2003). Given that people who opt out of responding represents a meaningful slice of society, the options for "Don't Know" and "Refuse to Answer" were included in all questions and accounted for during our analyses. During data screening and cleaning, we found that coding these cases as missing kept missingness well below 5% and that there was no statistically significant difference after excluding Don't Know and Refuse to Answer during our analyses.⁵ Table 1 presents our descriptive statistics.

Analytic Plan

Analyses for this study were conducted using Stata 17 (StataCorp-LP, 2021). Missing data accounted for less than 5% of responses. Following data screening and cleaning, we ran a Pearson

correlation of all variables.⁶ Following correlation analysis, based on the categorical nature of the dependent variables, our regressions utilized an ordered Logit model $y^* = x'\beta + \varepsilon$. Our first model included all significant correlates reported in Table 1. Results indicated that multiple β 's would improve our test of y^* based on x' ; an *omodel* test also suggested a rejection of the parallelism assumption (for more on the violation of parallelism, see Wolf & Gould, 1998).⁷

Tables 2-3 present the results of our GOL analyses; given that we base our outcome measures on Likert scales, table columns reflect Likert categories with rows representing predictors. Statistics reported include coefficients, standard errors, and model fit statistics. In our narrative, we also provide odds-ratios; odds-ratios are a useful conversion for articulating the level of effect coming from a given predictor on each outcome.

Results

Our Pearson correlation finds support for all four of our hypotheses. In the parentheses that follow, we first report the correlation for *Sexual Assault* and second for *#MeToo*. Supporting H1, we find that people who self-report greater *Church Attendance* (.30 and .65) and *Conservative* (.29 and .46) political identity experience a statistically significant increase in their self-reported value-identities of *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition*. Supporting H2, as *Conservative* political identity (.51 and .43) increases, so does a person's agreement with the statements, "Accusations of sexual assault are accepted too easily in our current society," and "The #MeToo and related protests makes it too easy for sexual assault accusations to be made."

Supporting our remaining hypotheses, we find that as *Church Attendance* (.14 and .12), *Protestant* (.09), and *White Protestant* (.09 and .04) increases, so does agreement with our measures for *Sexual Assault* and *#MeToo*. Both *Doubt* and the specific name/label for religious affiliation were not statistically significant. Results also find that as values oriented toward *Conformity* (.17 and .14), *Tradition* (.27 and .21), *Achievement* (.13 and .12), *Power* (.13 and .12), and *Security* (.14 and .12) increases, so does a person's agreement with our outcomes. Supporting H4, as values oriented toward *Benevolence* (-.15 and -.17), *Universalism* (-.33 and -.31), as well as *Self-direction* (-.09 and -.09) increase, support of these statements decreases. Reinforcing prior research using our controls, we find that as *Education* (-.09 and -.14) increases, support of these statements decreases (Peleg-Koriat & Klar-Chalamish, 2020). Women (-.23 and -.25) were also less likely to report support for these statements (Kunst et al., 2019). *Age*, *Income*,

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables

<i>Variable Name</i>	\bar{x} (<i>SD</i>)	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>N</i>
#MeToo	2.744 (1.390)	1	5	1,347
Sexual Assault	2.633 (1.287)	1	5	1,355
Church Attendance	1.089 (1.581)	0	6	1,345
Protestant	.206 (.404)	0	1	1,370
White Protestant	.165 (.371)	0	1	1,371
Doubt	.162 (.369)	0	1	604
Political Identity	2.626 (1.147)	1	5	1,351
Conformity	5.341 (1.995)	2	14	1,378
Tradition	7.087 (2.337)	2	14	1,378
Benevolence	4.238 (1.812)	2	14	1,378
Universalism	4.025 (1.945)	2	14	1,378
Self-Direction	4.196 (1.768)	2	14	1,378
Stimulation	6.091 (2.020)	2	14	1,378
Hedonism	5.134 (1.919)	2	14	1,378
Achievement	6.137 (2.248)	2	14	1,378
Power	6.851 (2.232)	2	14	1,378
Security	5.093 (1.915)	2	14	1,378
Education	5.059 (1.376)	1	8	1,368
South	.293 (.455)	0	1	1,380
Income	4.219 (1.777)	1	8	1,332
Race	5.432 (1.305)	1	7	1,370
White	.794 (.404)	0	1	1,370
Age	37.702 (11.967)	18	76	1,366
Sex		0	1	1,352
Female	50.74			
Male	49.26			

\bar{x} = Mean or Proportion | *SD* = Standard Deviation

Race (including *White*), and *South* were not statistically significantly correlated with our attitude measures related to sexual assault reporting or #MeToo.

Test of Hypothesis Two

Turning to our regression analysis, looking at Table 2, we find support of H2, as conservative political identity increases, attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting decrease. Holding all other variables constant, as a respondent's self-report of *Liberal* identity increases, the log-odds ratio of strongly disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 1.62 and 1.66 times, Model 1 = .483 (.183) and Model 2 = .504 (.182). Looking at people who self-report as *Very Conservative*, holding all other

variables constant, as a respondent's conservative political identity increases, the log-odds ratio of strongly disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy decreases by 9.32 and 7.55 times, Model 1 = -2.233 (.588) and Model 2 = -2.022 (.538). Too, as a respondent's conservative political identity increases, the log-odds ratio of agreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 5.22 and 5.41 times, Model 1 = 1.652 (.529) and Model 2 = 1.688 (.526). As we anticipated a priori, the relationship between a person's self-reported political identity and (non)support for sexual assault reporting works in both directions, with self-reported liberal political identity predicting increased support for sexual assault reporting and self-reported conservative political

identity predicting decreased support for sexual assault reporting.

Looking at Table 3 we find further support for H2, and, consistent with our measure on *Sexual Assault*, as conservative political identity increases, support for #MeToo decreases. The relationship again works in both directions, with self-reported liberal political identity predicting increased support for #MeToo and self-reported conservative political identity predicting decreased support for #MeToo. Holding all other variables constant, as self-reported *Liberal* political identity increases, the log-odds ratio of strongly disagreeing that the #MeToo movement

makes it too easy to report sexual assault increases by 1.55 and 1.54 times, Model 3 = .435 (.182) and Model 4 = .433 (.182). Models 3 and 4 show that using the term #MeToo draws out larger effect sizes; for example, holding all other variables constant, as conservative political identity increases, the log-odds ratio of strongly disagreeing that the #MeToo movement makes it too easy to report sexual assault decreases by 8.11 and 6.21 times, Model 3 = -2.092 (.597) Model 4 = -1.827, and, consistent with Models 1 and 2, as a respondent's conservative political identity increases, the log-odds ratio of agreeing that the #MeToo movement makes sexual assault reporting

Table 2: Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression of Sexual Assault Attitudes

Variables	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Or Disagree	Agree
Model 1: Sexual Assault with Church Attendance				
Liberal	.483 (.183)**	.315 (.204)	.305 (.240)	-.155 (.468)
Moderate	-1.491 (.241)***	-1.269 (.220)***	.932 (.246)***	.402 (.463)
Conservative	-2.124 (.331)***	-1.515 (.247)***	1.479 (.263)***	.646 (.480)
Very Conservative	-2.233 (.588)***	-2.041 (.383)***	1.796 (.349)***	1.652 (.529)**
Church Attendance	.069 (.069)	.002 (.054)	-.006 (.054)	.034 (.084)
Conformity	-.022 (.052)	-.053 (.045)	-.040 (.046)	.096 (.072)
Tradition	-.029 (.052)	-.073 (.044)	-.060 (.045)	.130 (.077)
Benevolence	.202 (.056)***	.106 (.049)*	.161 (.051)**	.058 (.086)
Universalism	.188 (.062)**	.206 (.047)***	.119 (.046)**	-.103 (.073)
Security	-.086 (.045)*	-.067 (.041)	-.104 (.044)*	.252 (.081)**
Education	.167 (.054)**	.253 (.047)***	-.183 (.048)***	-.135 (.084)
Sex	-.914 (.15)***	-.862 (.129)***	-.754 (.137)***	.723 (.248)**
_cons	-.243 (.54)	-.359 (.447)	-.616 (.456)	-1.354 (.814)
Model 1 fit statistics = standard error N = 1,290 *** $\rho \leq .001$, ** $\rho \leq .01$, * $\rho \leq .05$ LR chi2(56) = 500.76 Prob > chi2 = .001 Log likelihood = -1715.1242 Pseudo R2 = .1313				
Model 2: Sexual Assault Attitudes without Church Attendance				
Liberal	.504 (.182)**	.310 (.203)	.287 (.240)	-.162 (.467)
Moderate	-1.500 (.238)***	-1.297 (.219)***	.933 (.245)***	.434 (.461)
Conservative	-2.127 (.330)***	-1.491 (.246)***	1.470 (.262)***	.626 (.479)
Very Conservative	-2.022 (.538)***	-1.873 (.368)***	1.721 (.344)***	1.688 (.526)***
Conformity	-.027 (.051)	-0.062 (.044)	-.042 (.045)	.079 (.071)
Tradition	-.063 (.041)	-0.082 (.035)*	-.060 (.037)	.120 (.064)*
Benevolence	.186 (.055)***	.093 (.048)*	.144 (.050)**	.030 (.085)
Universalism	.199 (.061)***	.217 (.047)***	.126 (.046)**	-.120 (.072)
Security	-.071 (.044)	-.048 (.040)	-.095 (.043)*	.239 (.079)**
Education	.168 (.054)**	.249 (.045)***	-.178 (.047)***	-.119 (.080)
Sex	-.934 (.149)***	-.878 (.128)***	-.769 (.136)***	.683 (.245)**
_cons	.066 (.456)	-.260 (.380)	-.595 (.392)	-1.255 (.719)
Model 2 fit statistics = standard error N = 1,312 *** $\rho \leq .001$, ** $\rho \leq .01$, * $\rho \leq .05$ LR chi2(56) = 503.78 Prob > chi2 = .001 Log likelihood = -1749.3959 Pseudo R2 = .1298				

too easy increases by 13.03 and 13.83 times, Model 3 = 2.567 (.480) and Model 4 = 2.627 (.476).

Test of Hypothesis Three

The Pearson correlation results found support of H3. As frequency of church attendance increased, support for *Sexual Assault* reporting and *#MeToo* decreased (.14 and .12); that is, there is a negative correlation between church attendance and sexual assault reporting and expressions of support for the

#MeToo movement. However, our GOL analyses did not find a statistically significant direct relationship between frequency of church attendance and support for sexual assault reporting or #MeToo (this includes non-significant results for dummied variables for *Doubt* as well as *Protestant, Religious vs. Not*, and *White Protestant*). Despite these results, based on prior research (see Whitehead & Perry, 2020) and coupled with the correlation findings, we continue to hypothesize that the primacy of religious

Table 3: Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression of #MeToo Attitudes

Variables	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Or Disagree	Agree
Model 3: #MeToo Including Church Attendance				
Liberal	.435 (.182)*	.428 (.205)*	.401 (.246)	-.061 (.441)
Moderate	-1.392 (.236)***	-1.592 (.223)***	1.429 (.253)***	1.071 (.416)**
Conservative	-1.948 (.325)***	-1.970 (.255)***	1.918 (.276)***	1.526 (.426)***
Very Conservative	-2.092 (.597)***	-3.088 (.480)***	2.918 (.401)***	2.567 (.480)***
Church Attendance	-.089 (.066)	-.044 (.055)	.035 (.056)	-.061 (.075)
Conformity	-.134 (.050)**	-.046 (.045)	.005 (.046)	.058 (.065)
Tradition	-.164 (.051)**	-.126 (.045)**	-.037 (.047)	-.096 (.069)
Benevolence	.225 (.055)***	.120 (.051)*	.080 (.051)	.046 (.073)
Universalism	.188 (.058)**	.197 (.048)***	.187 (.046)***	-.194 (.056)***
Power	-.035 (.035)	-.025 (.031)	-.041 (.032)	.124 (.042)*
Security	-.016 (.044)	-.056 (.042)	-1.185 (.045)***	.247 (.064)***
Education	.189 (.055)***	.148 (.046)***	-.041 (.047)	-.053 (.068)
Sex	-.722 (.150)***	-.817 (.133)***	-.861 (.139)***	.691 (.202)***
_cons	2.499 (.552)***	-.330 (.459)	-.762 (.518)	-.998 (.665)
Model 3 fit statistics = standard error N = 1,287 *** $\rho \leq .001$, ** $\rho \leq .01$, * $\rho \leq .05$ LR chi2(56) = 610.50 Prob > chi2 = .001 Log likelihood = -1717.112 Pseudo R2 = .1535				
Model 4: #MeToo Attitudes without Church Attendance				
Liberal	.433 (.182)*	.431 (.204)*	.411 (.246)	-.009 (.439)
Moderate	-1.379 (.233)***	-1.606 (.222)***	1.431 (.252)***	1.146 (.413)**
Conservative	-1.911 (.323)***	-1.933 (.253)***	1.907 (.274)***	1.598 (.423)***
Very Conservative	-1.827 (.556)***	-2.906 (.460)***	2.766 (.388)***	2.627 (.476)***
Conformity				
Tradition	-.142 (.049)**	-.046 (.044)	-.004 (.045)	.035 (.063)
Benevolence	-.125 (.041)**	-.126 (.045)**	-.058 (.038)	-.042 (.056)
Universalism	.218 (.054)***	.120 (.050)*	.081 (.052)	.033 (.072)
Power	.203 (.058)**	.206 (.047)***	.198 (.046)***	-.200 (.057)***
Security	-.032 (.035)	-.031 (.031)	-.032 (.038)	-.112 (.041)**
Education	-.022 (.044)	-.052 (.041)	-.161 (.045)***	-.253 (.063)***
Sex	.196 (.054)***	.153 (.045)***	-.034 (.046)	-.052 (.067)
_cons	-.733 (.148)***	-.837 (.132)***	-.804 (.137)***	-.697 (.199)***
Model 4 fit statistics = standard error N = 1,312 *** $\rho \leq .001$, ** $\rho \leq .01$, * $\rho \leq .05$ LR chi2(56) = 503.78 Prob > chi2 = .001 Log likelihood = -1749.3959 Pseudo R2 = .1506				

socialization—particularly around values shaped within traditionally androcentric movements—acts as a primary source of meaning making giving shape to the statistically significant *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition* value-identities. We test this assumption in Figure 2 using our SEM path analysis.

Test of Hypothesis Four

Across the permutations of our analysis, we found broad support for H4; that is, as value-identities oriented toward *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition* increase, attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo decrease, whereas value-identities oriented toward *Benevolence* and *Universalism* increase attitudes of support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo.

To highlight a few results, looking at the comparisons when *Church Attendance* is removed in Model 2, holding all other variables constant, as a person's value identity oriented toward *Tradition* increases, the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy decreases by .92 times Model 2 = -.082 (.035), and the log-odds ratio of Agreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by .88 times Model 2 = .120 (.064). As a person's value identity oriented toward *Benevolence* increases, holding all other variables constant, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 1.236 and 1.213 times, Model 1 = .202 (.056) and Model 2 = .186 (.055). For *Benevolence*, the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 1.124 and 1.101 times, Model 1 = .106 (.049) and Model 2 = .093 (.048).

Turning to *Universalism*, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 1.242 and 1.252 times, Model 1 = .188 (.062) and Model 2 = .199 (.061), and the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting is too easy increases by 1.261 and 1.272 times, Model 1 = .206 (.047) and Model 2 = .217 (.047).

Models 3 and 4 show that using the term #MeToo continues to draw out larger effect sizes. We find that when *Church Attendance* is removed in Model 4, holding all other variables constant, as a person's value identity oriented toward *Conformity* increases, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault decreases by .87 times Model 4 = -.142 (.049). Looking at *Tradition*, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault decreases by .88 times Model 4 = -.125 (.041), and the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault decreases by .89 times Model 4 = -.126 (.045).

As *Benevolence* increases, holding all other variables constant, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault increases by 1.253 and 1.244 times, Model 3 = .225 (.055) and Model 4 = .218 (.054). For *Benevolence*, the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault increases by 1.128 and 1.103 times, Model 3 = .120 (.051) and Model 4 = .120 (.050).

Turning to *Universalism*, in Models 3 and 4, the log-odds ratio of Strongly Disagreeing that sexual assault reporting makes it too easy to report sexual assault increases by 1.206 and 1.226 times, Model 3 = .188 (.058) and Model 4 = .203 (.058), and the log-odds ratio of Disagreeing that #MeToo makes it too easy to report sexual assault reporting increases by 1.218 and 1.230 times, Model 3 = .197 (.048) and Model 4 = .206 (.047). Looking at *Universalism*, the log-odds ratio of Agreeing that #MeToo makes sexual assault reporting makes too easy decreases by 1.214 and 1.221 times, Model 3 = -.194 (.056) and Model 4 = .200 (.057).


Path Analysis Results

Figure 2 displays the results of our SEM analysis. We find support for the Logit models already reported with additional insights coming from both the direct and indirect effects present in the model. Consistent with the above, in the parentheses that follow, we first report the parameter estimates for *Sexual Assault* and then for #MeToo. All parameter estimates in Figure 2 were significant at the $p \leq .001$ level except for the path from *Conservative* → *Benevolence* and *Education* → *Universalism*, which were significant at the $p \leq .01$ level.

Before looking at statistically significant results, it is worth noting the paths not present in our emergent model. Our SEM found no statistically significant direct pathway from *Church Attendance*, *Conservative*, or *Conformity* to either *Sexual Assault* or #MeToo. In addition, controls for *Age*, *Doubt*, *Income*, *Race*, *Religious vs. Not*, *White*, and *White Protestant* were not statistically significant. Value identity domains remained consistently significant, reflecting the findings in our Logit models; in the SEM analysis, we focus on our primary dichotomy between *Conformity*, *Security*, and *Tradition* versus *Benevolence* and *Universalism*.

Direct Effects

We find additional support for H1, with *Church Attendance* positively predicting value-identities of *Conformity* (.13, .14), *Security* (.17, .16), and *Tradition* (.84, .84) and negative prediction on *Benevolence* (-.26, -.26). We find that *Conservative* political identity positively predicts *Tradition* (.61,

Figure 2: Unstandardized Structural Equation Path Model on #MeToo Attitudes

.6) and negatively predicting *Benevolence* (-.12, -.13) and *Universalism* (-.59, -.58). Supporting H4, we find that *Tradition* (.059, .073) and *Security* (.069, .076) decreases support for *Sexual Assault* reporting and #MeToo and that *Benevolence* (-.24, -.36) and *Universalism* (-.65, -.86) increases support. We also find that *Education* (.078, .084) positively predicts *Universalism* and that when it comes to *Sex*, women are more likely to self-report a value-identity related to *Benevolence* (-.71, -.72).

Indirect Effects

Additional support for H2 comes from moderated mediation in the model. As *Conservative* increases, support for *Sexual Assault* (.44, $p \leq .001$) reporting and #MeToo (.58, $p \leq .001$) decreases. Support for H3 also comes from moderated mediation. As *Church Attendance* increases, support for *Sexual Assault* (.02, $p \leq .05$) reporting and #MeToo (.03, $p \leq .05$) decreases. Notably, additional support for H4 comes from the indirect effect of *Conformity* equally decreasing support for both *Sexual Assault* (.03, $p \leq .05$) reporting and #MeToo (.03, $p \leq .05$).

Correlation

Correlations in our data support previous research finding a negative link between *Education*

(-.14, -.15) and *Conservative* as well as a negative association between *Education* (-.12, -.15) and *Church Attendance* (see Dawkins, 2006). We also find that women are less likely to self-report church attendance (.079, .08), a conservative political orientation (-.046, -.045) while also reporting higher levels of education (-.016, -.012).

Fit statistics indicated good overall model fit; too, overall R^2 for *Sexual Assault* = .68 and for #MeToo = .70 finding the emergent model is accounting for nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of the variance.

Discussion

Not surprisingly, the results of our analysis suggest a complex relationship between politics, religion, and values as predictors of people's attitudes relating to support for sexual assault reporting and the #MeToo movement. Attendance at religious services was less powerful when modeled as a direct predictor in our regression models; despite this result, we found that religious participation is a statistically significant indirect effect. This supports our hypothesis that religious participation acts as an antecedent influence filtering through mediation of value-based-identities, which stifles support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo. The complexity of these linkages may also

account for why early research on the value-behavior linkage has often been unable to parse the social psychological influence value-identities have on behavior (again, see Lee et al., 2021, for more on this point). This interpretation of our results aligns with Aldecoa's (2019) notions that as people develop a moral value-identity, it serves as "a higher-order or 'principal level' identity...guiding the meanings of lower-order or 'program level' identities and related behaviors" (p.123).

Our results lead us to advance a sociologically informed framework in which androcentric religious traditions and polarized political identity meanings (i.e., liberal vs. conservative) acts as a primary source of socialization for higher-order principle level values filtering down into program level value-based-identities defined by notions of conformity, security, and tradition that we found statistically significantly reduces support for sexual assault reporting (for more on this point, see Gezinski, 2012) and the politically charged protest movement #MeToo (see Purvis & Fico, 2020, for an interesting discussion of support for #MeToo between religious vs. non-religious educational settings). Such an interpretation also connects to the work of Allport (1967) who found that "religious maturity" among believers predicts an inward focused, or intrinsic, religious orientation versus an outward focused, or extrinsic, religious orientation. Group level pressures isolate, stigmatize, and silence people (see Lanier & Maume, 2009) who challenge the traditional, patriarchal, and/or conservatively oriented values of the group (Gezinski et al., 2019).

Given the oblique relationship our study of conformity, security, and tradition has with work investigating the effects of movements like Christian Nationalism, we encourage scholars to directly examine the social psychological aspects shaping identity related behaviors. Our work here suggests, then, that value-identities are effectively where the rubber meets the road. As meanings related to conformity, security, and tradition are internalized, the potential for and rise of violent acts as a defense of the "moral order" also seems increasingly likely. For example, value identities rooted in these areas potentially provide a narrative of "structural privileges" to conservative Christians—while casting a threatened Christian heteropatriarchy that needs vigorous defense (Bjork-James, 2019).⁸ In summation, our findings suggest the intersection between conservative politics and androcentric religious participation catalyzes value-identities likely to go beyond issues directly measured here. In this way, value-identities defined by conformity, security, and tradition are likely core pillars of meaning influencing a broad range of issues overlapping with our work here

and with direct implications for increasing violent conflicts propelled by such movements as Christian Nationalism.

In this study, we have tested a small piece of the pathway running from meanings to values and from value-identities to behavior. Meanings are informed by church attendance and conservative political identity promoting value-identities of conformity, security, and tradition, which, in turn, suppresses support for sexual assault reporting and the #MeToo movement, whereas value-identities oriented toward benevolence and universalism increases support for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo.

We suspect that the moral identity framework employed here may also be meaningfully applied to analyses of attitudes about mobilization toward related issues while also motivating countermobilization directed at other social justice-oriented movements. Sorting out how and why value-identities like conformity, security, and tradition—among others value-identity domains—may be implicated in contemporary movements is an important endeavor. While the movement's literature is deeply engaged with issues of politics, power, and even identity (see Reger et al., 2008), we aspire to push the conversation deeper into the realm of the interaction between foundational values and external social forces. We expect that this work may be fruitful for two reasons. First, we hope this work contributes to the reclamation of the micro-foundations of social movement mobilization and second, helps to move the discourse away from the vulgarity of the "frustration-aggression / bad old days" framework of the so-called "classical model" of social movements research.

Limitations and Future Directions

As with any cross-sectional study design, we are limited by our snapshot in time as well as the idiosyncrasies of MTurk data. To our knowledge, we are among the first to test the social psychological intersection (i.e., moderated mediation) between politics, religion, and values as predictive of attitudes about supporting sexual assault reporting and #MeToo. Further analyses will need to continue filling in the gaps; future longitudinal examinations of ours and related questions must be sensitive to the complex social psychological mediation and moderation effects that we hypothesize are driving the relationship between politics, religion, and value-identity formation and enactment.

Despite the limitations of this study, we find the results of our analysis to be compelling given the state of research into the political, religious, and value-identity domains under investigation; values that work as both principal and program level sources of identity giving rise to violent protests related to issues

informed by things like Christian Nationalism. Few studies have been aimed at this intersection, fewer still from the lens of sociological social psychology. We find this to be a natural home for this line of inquiry to continue, hoping that we can continue to contribute to this discourse as well as catalyze critiques and further tests of our work here. To close the circle, support for #MeToo began with “virtue signaling” from a broad intersection of people, but support is now aligned along political and religious identity boundaries. Divisions of this nature contribute to the likelihood for conflict, even violent conflict. To successfully rebuild lines of communication, thereby mitigating the potential for future violence, an understanding of the sociological features of identity development seems a useful starting point.

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Endnotes

¹ Our approach is to operationalize political orientation as political ideology rather than partisanship. While the two measures are increasingly correlated, our approach is one rooted in values and identity. This orientation leaves us theoretically inclined toward the greater utility of ideology in making sense of our outcome of interest.

² As noted in our review of the literature, religious “Nones” are the fastest growing self-report group; given this, MTurk data provides a useful, if potentially non-traditional, estimate of the arguments we make in this paper.

³ Granting the sociological bases of identity development our operationalization of liberal vs. conservative—with the caveat considering interest—is a measure of political ideology and not partisanship.

⁴ For parsimony and based on the results of analysis finding that the religious group was not a statistically significant predictor we have cut these 15 categories from the descriptive statistics table. Additionally, testing of dummied groups around 0 = Not Religious and 1 = Religious were controlled for but also proved non-significant and were cut from the final models reported.

⁵ Commentary on these distinctions falls outside of the main scope of this paper; however, they are available upon request of the first author.

⁶ Once again, to streamline our narrative and based on the large size and complexity of the table, we have opted not to include the full correlation matrix in the body of the paper. Full correlation results including table findings are available upon request of the lead author.

⁷ To further check for a violation of parallelism, we ran a Brant test. Results of the Brant test indicated that the proportional odds assumption was violated. To model the differing variance of y^* based on X_j when controlling for Z_j (see Long & Freese, 2006), we adopted a Generalized Ordered Logit (GOL) approach using *gologit2* (for more on GOL, see R. Williams, 2006). The null hypothesis when running a Brant test (like the Omodel and Wald tests) is that coefficients are the same across categories. A p -value lower than .005 indicates that the impact of the predictor variables is different across the categories of the dependent. Our result here is = .001; according to both the Wald and Omodel tests, we have violated the proportional odds assumption, and our Logit model adopted a GOL analysis.

⁸ In a related piece we are working on, we tested a model similar to the ones reported here with outcomes of self-reported support for the Black Lives Matter vs. Blue Lives Matter protest movements. While that paper is still under development, it is noteworthy that Conformity, Security, Tradition vs. Benevolence and Universalism breaks the same way as it does for sexual assault reporting and #MeToo with value-identities of Conformity, Security, and Tradition decreasing support for Black Lives Matter while increasing support for Blue Lives Matter and vice-versa for Benevolence and Universalism.