This article draws on a modified Bourdieusian typology to explore capital exchanges between public police and buyers (users) in ‘user pays’ policing. Drawing on interviews and analysis of freedom of information disclosures in Ontario, Canada, we contribute to security network and ‘user pays’ policing literatures by demonstrating that user types vary in the volume of capital exchanged and by city/region and that this linkage can be understood as a two-way exchange of forms of capital rather than unidirectional ‘responsibilization.’ These exchanges primarily involve economic and body capital. We argue that problematization of user pays policing requires political capital to be exchanged. This represents public police’s failure to achieve symbolic capital due to the unskilled labour ‘user pays’ policing is found to entail. We conclude by identifying avenues for future network research revealed by our analysis.

Keywords: capital exchange, Bourdieu, user pays, body capital, networks, responsibilization, public police

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local police service level. In some Ontario cities/regions, users are required by municipal policies or bylaws to hire paid duty officers for events, including festivals held on public property. A typical paid duty system is Peel Region’s, which covers suburban Toronto, including the cities of Brampton and Mississauga. Users request officers for assignments from Peel Region’s central paid duty office. The office then decides how many officers will be required and awards assignments to interested officers with the fewest number of paid duty hours for the year (Police 1). There is a three-hour minimum charge per officer whose current rate, including an administrative fee, totals $94.14 CDN per hour. One assignment costs users a minimum of $282.42 CDN, most of which officers receive as extra pay. The vast majority (81-85%) of this sum enters individual officers’ pockets rather than the operational resources of the police service.

This article contributes to literatures on security networks, ‘user pays’ policing, as well as to Bourdieusian literature on criminal justice. We refine one typology of capital exchange and security networks by including a focus on body capital and revisiting the notion of symbolic capital. We suggest this Bourdieusian perspective helps conceptualize user pays policing arrangements. In particular, attention to the volume and forms of capital exchange helps explain the attraction of and controversies over paid duty policing in Canada. We identify different user types across Ontario and show that their prevalence and the volume of capital exchanged across nodal linkages vary by city/region. Our study suggests that paid duty involves two-way exchanges of capital (defined in detail below) in local security networks, but primarily an exchange of body and economic capital. Exchange of cultural capital happens, but only for a minority of user types. This is also true of social capital exchanges under current regulations across Ontario cities/regions. When controversies over user pays policing occur in these local networks, we argue that they represent public police’s failure to convert body and economic capital into symbolic capital. This then requires political capital to be exchanged. Resulting official responses target the flow of capital within these networks. These responses are significant; if high volumes of capital are exchanged, less may be available for the public good.

First, we review literature on security networks, user pays policing, and capital exchange. Second, we discuss our research methods. Third, we identify distinct types of users of paid duty policing and investigate the volume of their capital exchanges. Fourth, we examine five kinds of capital exchanges between users and police across this linkage. We conclude by assessing the implications of our analysis for research on security networks, user pays policing, and Bourdieusian literature on capital exchange in criminal justice studies.

Security Networks, User Pays Policing, and Capital Exchanges

The study of security networks in criminology and criminal justice studies has expanded considerably in the past two decades (Dupont, 2004, 2006; Giacomantonio, 2014; Gill, 2006; Huey, 2008; Newburn, 2001; Shearing, 2005; Shearing & Johnston, 2010; Sparrow, 1991; Terpstra, 2008; Whelan, 2015; Wood & Dupont, 2006). Networks comprise ‘nodes’ which are key actors and sites of governance. Nodes are not only public; rather, “[n]odes can be public, private or hybrid institutions and may include anything from police departments to private corporations” (Huey, Nhan, & Broll, 2012, p. 84). Nodes include “individuals, groups (and parts of groups), organizations (and parts of organizations), or states” (Shearing & Johnston, 2010, p. 501); a way of conceiving of what is governed; ways of shaping conduct; operational resources; and an institutional structure enabling these elements (Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, 2005, pp. 37-8). Here we limit our focus2 to resources (capital) and institutions (users and police) in security networks.

Research on user pays policing, sometimes described as private employment of public police (Reiss, 1988), is growing (Ayling, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2009; Ayling & Shearing, 2008; Gans, 2000; Mulone, 2013; Wood, 2000). User pays policing is becoming more pervasive as states seek to reduce public expenditures for policing amidst claims of increasing costs (Barker & Crawford, 2013; Powell, 2014; Public Safety Canada, 2013). Yet, user pays policing is overlooked in security networks literature, with two notable exceptions. First, Loader, Goold, and Thumala (2014) have argued that user pays policing is an element of security markets and what they refer to as “corrosive exchange” due to its detrimental effect on the public good (p.11). Though not invoking the notion of ‘capital,’ their approach resonates with ours by acknowledging exchanges between police and users and the possibility of controversy over them.

A second notable exception suggests that users in user pays policing serve as an ‘arm’ of the public police (Ayling et al., 2009). They assert that for event policing specifically, besides cost recovery, a police department’s underlying objective… is to educate event organisers about how to manage events from a security perspective… An important element here is the ‘responsibilization’… of organizers so that they will manage events in
ways that limit demands on police resources (p. 150).

However, to the extent that ‘responsabilization’ here refers to a transfer of responsibility for security provision from the state to private actors and a one-way downloading rather than a complex exchange, including exchange within the state realm, we suggest below that characterizing user pays policing as such requires more specification of what kind of responsibility is being transferred consistent with the different forms of capital we outline below.

Bourdieu’s work has been used in criminal justice studies to examine the practices of probation officers (Robinson, Priede, Farrall & Shapland, 2014), prison guard work (Drake, 2011), and the network connections of neighbourhood wardens (Crawford, 2006). Other scholars have remarked upon public police using a Bourdieusian framework. Wood (2004) has noted that “public police have been emphasizing the specific capitals they have accumulated over time (political, cultural, symbolic) in challenging the legitimacy of non-state providers of security” (p. 36). Chan (2003) describes police requirements for social, cultural, and other capitals. While these authors and the security network and user pays policing literatures lend insight into themes discussed below, they have not fully explored capital exchanges, except for Dupont (2004).

Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1989) studies of capital exchange, Dupont (2004) outlines a typology of five forms of capital relevant to security networks and nodes: economic, symbolic, cultural, social, and political (see also Huey et al., 2012). First, economic capital refers to financial resources. Second, for Dupont (2004), symbolic capital is about legitimacy, “power ... to speak with authority to other actors” (p. 86). Third, cultural capital refers to police knowledge, proficiency, and expertise, such as in criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing (Dupont, 2004, pp. 85-86). Fourth, social capital is the “set of social relations that allow the constitution, maintenance, and expansion of social networks,” which is also associated with opportunities for political favors and corruption (Crawford, 2006; Dupont, 2004, p. 86). Finally, Dupont (2004) indicates that political capital “derives from the proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives” (p. 85). Yet, in policing and security literature, study of the volume of capital exchanged is limited. So too is the study of particular forms of capital exchanged by public police (see Huey, 2008 on cultural capital), as well as how police convert or fail to convert other capitals into symbolic capital. As Lawler (2011) notes, unconverted forms of capital have yet to be sufficiently investigated in Bourdieusian literature on capital exchange.

To help address these gaps, we modify Dupont’s typology of capital exchange in two ways. First, for Bourdieu, symbolic capital is not a kind of capital one can have, but refers to converting economic, cultural, or social capital (or political or body capital) for some gain in the field. As Lawler (2011) explains, inherent in symbolic capital is the outcome of the conversion of other forms of capital. Bourdieu defines symbolic capital as “the form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” [1989: 17]. Hence, although apparently conceptually existing in Bourdieu’s work alongside the other “capitals”—economic, cultural, and social—symbolic capital is not a different form of capital, but rather should be seen as the legitimated, recognized form of the other capitals (original emphasis). (pp. 1417-1418)

The idea of symbolic capital neither refers simply to legitimacy nor to something allocated to police. Forms of capital are relational and only gain value in exchange (Robbins, 2005).

Second, Wacquant (1995) argues that physical display and ability of workers can be conceptualized as body capital, sometimes called physical capital (Chan, 2003; Shilling, 2004). This form of capital refers to valuing what workers do with their bodies or how physical features become prized at work. Doormen at bars and nightclubs (Monaghan, 2004) as well as at exclusive urban residences (Bearman, 2005) are examples of such workers. Accumulation of body capital can result from worker training but also from adornment in uniforms and equipment (Wacquant, 1995). This form of capital is illustrated by the ‘blading’ uniformed police officer. ‘Blading’ is a police power stance that entails turning toward a suspect to make the officer’s body a smaller target and to signal potential use of weaponry. But when a uniformed officer receives almost $100/hour CDN extra to adopt this stance while holding a take-away coffee cup, guarding a street pothole, or standing on a sidewalk next to a Hollywood movie shoot, this visible display of misused body capital invites critique by the public and other stakeholders as we discuss later. It creates an image of public police inconsistent with the notion that they skilfully and impartially serve the public good. The bodily presence of public police on its own does not equal legitimacy. There may be overlap between symbolic and body capital depending upon what meaning is assigned to a particular body, but because our study shows authority is represented...
by the uniformed police officer body in particular sites, we add body capital to Dupont’s (2004) typology and retain symbolic capital as status resulting from capital conversion.

Relying on this modified typology of capital exchange, we focus on one form of nodal linkage between users and providers of paid duty policing, which is best examined in local security networks within a jurisdiction. There are of course other nodal linkages in these networks (between public police and private security firms, between other public law enforcement agencies and private security firms, between private businesses or broader ‘business improvement associations’ and private security firms, between corporate security departments of local public and private organizations and public police, and between public police and business improvement associations, some of which we have mapped in our work, see Lippert & O’Connor, 2006; Lippert, 2012; Lippert & Sleiman, 2012; Walby & Lippert, 2015). But the benefit of exploring one nodal linkage in a security network is the capacity to expose capital flows between nodes that may remain hidden in network mapping exercises that take a broader view. Focusing on one linkage by identifying user types as well as the volume of capital exchange and kinds of capital moving across it promises to advance the literatures described above by providing a detailed picture of user pays policing in security networks as well as of how it may be harming the public good.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

We have used three complementary means of producing data for this case study: interviews, freedom of information (FOI) requests, and collection and examination of print media coverage of paid duty policing. First, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with police personnel, including paid duty officers (5), ‘users’ of these services (16), and police board members (2) and city officials (2) who oversee municipal police expenditures from across the four Ontario police services. We selected these services based upon whether they were large enough to have paid duty arrangements (some small services do not), were located in one jurisdiction (Ontario), were all municipal services (Ontario Provincial Police, which is centrally organized, and was presumed to have different arrangements), and which would be in close proximity to the primary author’s Ontario university for conducting personal interviews and retrieving freedom of information documents due in part to a limited research budget. Our design is what Yin (2003) refers to as an exploratory and multiple case study. It is an exploratory case study design because we are comparing within and between four cases. As Yin (2003) notes, case study design strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Interview participants were identified in news media accounts commenting on paid duty arrangements (municipal officials), from police service websites (police), and from paid duty assignment data from police services (see below). The assignment data made available through FOI requests in most cases provided specific names of individual or organizational users from which we could then find contact information. Once identified, we invited users of various types to be interviewed (bar owners, hospital officials, school officials, and movie production companies). Selected participants were sent a letter inviting them to participate in an interview. Not all users and police personnel sent letters agreed to be interviewed. Interview questions for police personnel included questions about the benefits of paid duty.

Interviews with ‘users’ of these services entailed a 23-question interview schedule exploring paid duty experiences. Because this was an exploratory project on paid duty with limited resources, we did not operationalize specific forms of capital via specific questions using a Bourdieusian framework. Thus, a limitation of the study is that we did not conduct the research with Bourdieusian concepts in mind from the outset. Instead, the forms of capital were discerned from our interview data. Most important for discerning the type of capital being exchanged for users from a 23-question schedule were the following questions:

- Can you request a particular officer when you employ these officers?
- Can you request a particular officer not be assigned to your organization?
- Has the hiring of public police officers benefited your organization; If so, how?
- Has it benefited the community; If so, how?
- The individual officer; If so, how?
- Has hiring public police officers been a disadvantage to your organization; If so, how?
- Has it disadvantaged the community; If so, how?
- How and to what extent were officers employed by your organization visible to the public?
- Did officers wear uniforms and carry firearms while employed by your organization?
What did the officers do while working for your organization? For example, did they interact with the public (customers, clients, etc.)?

Did they move around, or were they stationed in one place?

Did they make arrests or issue warnings?

What kinds of assignments/organizations are preferred among officers?

What kinds are deemed to be less attractive?

For police services, we used a 27-question schedule. Most important for discerning types of capital were the following questions:

Has the hiring of police officers by organizations benefited your police service; If so, how?

Has it benefited the community; If so, how?

The individual officer; If so, how?

Has the hiring of police officers by organizations been a disadvantage to your organization; If so, how?

Has it disadvantaged the community? The individual officer; If so, how?

How and to what extent are the officers employed by an organization visible to the public; Do paid duty assignments of officers typically make them more or less visible to the public than regular assignments?

Second, we made FOI requests for numerical pay duty assignment data over a one-year period (2011-2012) from four Ontario police services: Toronto (5776 officers), Peel Region (1908 officers), London (587 officers), and Windsor (466 officers; Statistics Canada, 2011). Despite the word ‘freedom,’ these requested data cost several hundreds of dollars to retrieve and only after considerable negotiation and in one case lengthy stalling from police representatives became available. Once received, we analyzed these quantitative data to determine the volumes of capital exchanged between particular user types and police and recorded percentages. Third, we examined documents and print media coverage pertaining to paid duty arrangements in Ontario from 2000 to 2014 including paid duty application forms, police department policy and procedure documents, and two major audits/studies of paid duty in two Ontario cities. The controversies discussed below were primarily discovered through this third procedure, though they were also illuminated via interview data. Qualitative data were thematically analyzed and coded on the basis of types of capital to assess the capital exchanges occurring between police and paid duty users.

Police-User Nodal Linkage(s) and Capital Exchange Volume

In this section, we examine capital volume exchanged through a nodal linkage. Rather than analyze the volume exchanged through police ties with individual users, we first classify individual users into types. This provides the basis for researching capital exchanges in the next section. We then analyze number of officers per paid duty assignment across types. We assumed the number of officers ‘used’ by a set of users (e.g. construction or trucking) indicates the volume of capital exchanged between police and user type as noted above.

Figure 1 below represents the number of officers used by user types in the jurisdiction. This figure effectively shows the relative prevalence of user types and suggests the volume of capital exchanges across particular police-user linkages in the jurisdiction. Yet, user type matters, with some exchanging greater volumes of capital than others. For example, the construction company-police link involves the highest volume of capital exchange based on this measure. The trucking company-police link entails the lowest volume.
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Figure 1: Officers Used by User Type as a Percentage of Total in Four Cities/Regions

This figure above reflects police-user linkages across the jurisdiction. However, we also sought to determine whether city/region (or police department) matters and whether it is more prudent to examine four local security networks rather than one network spanning the jurisdiction. To do so, we examined volume of exchange of these user types by location. Our analysis in Figure 2 below concerning user types and cities/regions demonstrates the variation in volume of capital exchanges as measured by the number of officers used in the four cities/regions among identified user types. For example, restaurant/bar-related assignments were more prevalent in Windsor as a percentage of the total (28% of officers used in that location) than in Toronto (3 percent) and other cities/regions, and construction-related assignments were more prevalent in Toronto and Peel (20% of officers used in those two locations) than in London and Windsor (almost 0 percent and 1 percent, respectively).

Figure 2: Officers Used by User Type as a Percentage of City/Region Total in Four Cities/Regions

* "Entertainment" includes "Sports"
** "Other" includes "Blank," "Insurance," and "Redacted"
Each city/region, even within one jurisdiction (Ontario) operating under the same legislation (the Police Services Act), differs in the volume of capital exchanged across police-user linkages. This suggests that when exploring how nodal linkages of user pays policing are governed, generalizations about prevalence and volume of particular police-user linkages across the jurisdiction and whether they help form a broader network should be made cautiously. Since our focus is on one type of nodal linkage, we avoid trying to characterize the kind of security network (at least three types have been posited; Shearing & Johnston, 2010, p. 501) that it helps form. However, our research reveals that public police and users were enrolled in local security networks in each city/region, rather than in what Dupont (2004) calls an “institutional network” that “rarely involve[s] community groups or actors outside governmental spheres [and] … are efficiency-based, where local security networks are more focused on effectiveness” (p. 80). The networks enrolling paid duty users were not aimed at “the facilitation of inter-institutional bureaucratic projects or the pooling of resources across government agencies” (Dupont, 2004, p. 80). We found almost no active cooperation across Ontario police services regarding paid duty best practices or assignments. Because the volume of capital exchanged across different types of police-user links vary by city/region and are most accurately considered part of local networks, this requires analysis of specific capital exchanges and controversies over paid duty.

Specific Capital Exchanges in User Pays (Paid Duty) Policing

Now we examine the nature of the nodal linkage based on the specific capital exchanged (see also Elrel, 2010). Legislated requirements for paid duty for events on public property (see Valverde & Cirak, 2003, on Toronto’s annual gay pride parade) suggest a one-way transfer of responsibility rather than two-way exchange. Our research reveals that there is an exchange even if it involves certain user types at public locations being legally required to purchase paid duty from public police. Only one user indicated he had negotiated a reduction of the number of paid duty officers required for an assignment (i.e., he ‘whittled it down’) based on the number required for a past assignment (User 3). Typically, paid duty levels were non-negotiable, and there was no policy in the cities/regions studied to ratchet down the number of officers or hours of paid duty over time with gradual transfer of greater responsibility for security to users, as found regarding such events by Ayling et al. (2009, p. 150) in Australia. Even if events on public property were more apt to involve one-way transfer, in our case study, this type of assignment accounted for only a small proportion of paid duty officer numbers (see Figure 1). There is evidence of exchange of several forms of capital between police and users, primarily body capital and economic capital. Cultural capital is exchanged for economic capital, but only for some user types, and the volume is low. Some user types want social capital from police for economic capital, but this is difficult to obtain. As we discuss below, stakeholders often critique body, economic, and social capital. Failed conversions have threatened the symbolic capital of public police in at least three Ontario cities/regions. Political capital is exchanged when controversies over paid duty arrangements involving one or more of these capital exchanges occur. In other forms of user pays policing within different local networks, the volumes of exchange of these forms of capital below may well differ, but our point is that close attention to the volumes of each form help better understand what is at stake in user pays policing and what is transpiring at this link and in the broader networks of which they are a part.

Economic capital flows from users mostly to individual police officers. The average volume for 2013 in Toronto, based on a $26.1 million CDN total from assignments involving 3,047 officers reported in print media (Alcoba, 2014), was $8,566 CDN per officer, but is likely higher.6 One officer explained that his police service has officers who have … worked as many days as they possibly could and made more money than the Chief of Police in one year because of them working … on all their days off, but usually those people do it for a short period of time with some goal in mind like … to pay for his house. For the majority[,] … it’s simply a supplement to their monthly income. Somebody who has a larger family or two families–divorce being what it is in policing–they might be more inclined to earn more paid duties because of the financial pressure (Police 1).

Yet exchange of economic capital is not the only process of exchange in these networks. Police have body capital and physical prowess to display. A key finding from user interviews is that it is the visible, physical presence of paid duty officers that users value. Officers arrive for paid duty shifts at users’ locations in full uniform. We became aware of only one site where officers were plain-clothed, and even there they were accompanied by uniformed paid duty officers. Users frequently invoked the language of visibility and presence when articulating advantages of using public police for security provision:
It’s … a different atmosphere here. I’d rather see them walk around to the ER [emergency room] every fifteen minutes or so just to fly the flag and let everybody know that you’re here walking through. If I’m a patient and there is someone screaming, it’s nice to see a police officer walk through (User 9; emphasis added).

In another instance, visibility was more important than control at a nightclub:

I want them out there so when people are coming in … they see there’s a police presence … I want those police officers walking through, not to throw them out but to make sure that … people see there is police (User 14; emphasis added).

In response to whether a user would prefer to hire uniformed private security personnel who are also visible instead of public police, a user replied that there is a certain authority that an officer [has] in … their recognizable uniform … It’s really peace of mind; they know that there’s a friendly neighbourhood cop there … I think for the most part, police officers are viewed positively (User 12; emphasis added).

In these ways, body capital is also a key component of exchange in these networks and deserves to be part of the focus of Bourdieusian literature on policing and capital exchange.

Little cultural capital is exchanged in paid duty. Regardless of whether users pay for public police officers due to legal requirements or because of preference over security guards, police are rarely acquired for their ‘unique expertise.’ Officers do not arrive at paid duty assignments with crime control techniques, analysis software, and crime prevention guides in tow, all of which imply expertise. As one officer related, “the types of work that are done on paid duty differ dramatically [from regular duties]. You’re not responding to calls to service; you’re not investigating crimes. You’re largely there for a security function” (Police 3). One exception to this lack of cultural capital is in funeral procession and street closure assignments, where knowledge of traffic flows and rules is technical. Whether this is expertise is debatable since this is not unique knowledge: Private piloting services for escorting loads on highways and flag persons hired to stop traffic for road construction also know these requirements.

The primacy of body capital over cultural capital is not limited to paid duty arrangements in our dataset. In Hamilton, another Ontario city/region, restaurant owners cite police ‘visibility’ rather than, for instance, police ‘know-how’ as the benefit of paid duty services (e.g., Sizzle Koi, 2014). This primacy is evident when a former police chief from another Ontario city/region we interviewed reflected on the contrast between the growing emphasis on knowledge work in policing and paid duty: “If you’re looking at people who are attempting to resolve issues and conflicts using a different skill set … how does that coincide with someone standing inside a door to make sure a fight doesn’t break out?” (Police 2). Public police cannot convert accumulated cultural capital at this linkage because paid duty rarely involves use of expert knowledge.

Some users did desire social capital from paid duty officers. This is because social capital is about specific connections with a group, event, or site that brings some value, befitting the operations of, for example, the school dance event. One public school user related the following example:

[W]e have a program called Neighbourhood Policing Unit, so all the secondary schools have at least one officer assigned on a regular basis … [T]hat officer would be working … for the school year as a close liaison, doing presentations at the school … [and] working with students who have issues. These would be ideal officers to have at events [e.g. school dances], but unfortunately [this is difficult] because of the way the [paid duty] system is set up (User 13).

In another city, there was a longing for social capital, in particular for a paid duty officer who was accustomed to being at a user’s event:

Officers, they get asked for help … about the event itself because they’re [in] uniform, right? The uniform has authority but often enough when they’re in an event that they’ve never been to before. … It would have been nice to have … a regular deployment of the same officers, for example ones who could get to know the event, who is [sic.] familiar with the community (User 3; emphasis added).

However, as with cultural capital, social capital is not featured in these exchanges.

The types of users and volumes of capital vary across local security networks. The focus of controversy varies locally too. Controversies are...
indexed to the type(s) of capital exchanged, and these differ depending on the local network. Political capital enters these local networks when this contestation happens, as it did in Toronto and Hamilton over economic capital exchange, and in Windsor over social capital exchange.

**Controversies over User Pays Policing**

***Economic Capital and Political Capital in Toronto and Hamilton***

When the exchange of economic for body capital became viewed as inappropriate in two cities/regions due to failed conversions of body capital by the public police, paid duty began to be governed in ways that first required expenditure of political capital. For example, in Toronto, the nature of the controversy over paid duty is captured by a major local newspaper’s page one depiction that included observations and photographs of paid duty officers on assignment:

Toronto’s highly trained police officers rake in millions of dollars moonlighting as construction site guards, manhole watchers and other menial jobs that crossing guards or even pylons could do at a fraction of the cost, a Toronto Star investigation has found. ... Star reporters witnessed numerous examples of officers doing little or nothing at sites in the downtown core and throughout the city. Outside the Eaton Centre, an officer stood near a barricaded manhole. At another, an officer stood ... while a work crew refurbished the city-owned building’s front steps. ... [T]he cost to the taxpayer ... came to $523. (Bruser & Brazao, 2009, p. A1)

The problem with the exchange of economic for body capital was remarked upon by one city official: “I think that the way that Toronto was handling paid duty assignments was incorrect, and that we ... had a system that was generating $24 million for our police officers, much of which was coming out of the public budget” (City Official 1). Bruser & Brazao (2009, p. A1) reported in The Toronto Star that “police superintendent Earl Witty says having so many pay duty officers around the downtown core because they [the police service] could always make the argument of [high] traffic volume [and then require] paid duty for everything. ...While not legislated, it had been the practice [of City departments] to ... say to them, “We’re doing this project. Can you ... tell us if you need to have officers on the site?” And we’ll do this paid duty as opposed to ... draining the [regular police] force. ... But once a culture takes hold inside of the police forces, it’s pretty hard to undo. So we said we won’t do paid duty anymore and what we ended up in was a ... discussion on ... how to unwind the practice as opposed to stopping it. You end up dealing with political forces within police services. So it took seven years to undo ... in a way that didn’t leave bad blood between the police service ... and the police service board and the councillors. (City Official 2)

In Toronto, controversy focused on economic capital, not only tracking where it flowed post-exchange but also the volume that the City was transferring to individual officers:

A couple of officers ... were running $120,000 a year, almost all of it paid duty. People started going, “what the hell’s going on here?”... Then we started looking at the
impact on the city projects. ... So we’re requiring a paid duty officer when a flagman would have done, so why pay someone $80 an hour when you can pay somebody $20? (City Official 1)

A major audit of paid duty practices by the City of Toronto’s Auditor General was undertaken (Griffiths, 2011) to examine costs to the City. It focused on where economic capital was flowing and whether this flow should occur at all: “I realized, we’re using these officers for the Public Transit Authority[,] we’re using it for transportation street closures, parades.... A lot of these ... [paid duty assignments] are being covered out of the budget of the City” (City Official 2). In Toronto, stopping the flow of economic capital from the City to individual officers became the central concern of new regulations that reduced the requirement for paid duty officers at some City sites. For example, Toronto Hydro, Toronto Water, and other municipal units scaled back paid duty use after 2009. Body capital started to matter less for some public paid duty users. One user remarked that “what they do at the construction sites most of the time is drink coffee and talk on their cell phones” (User 6). Shilling (2004) has called for an analysis of how some social actors succeed or fail in converting physical capital into other forms. If we understand symbolic capital as resulting from conversion of economic, cultural, social, political, or body capital, the example of failed conversion of body capital demonstrates that paid duty policing were critiqued in a way that impedes the capacity of public police to convert other capitals. For stopping street traffic, City officials deemed a uniformed public police officer’s physical prowess and presence to be easily replaceable by a differently visible and far cheaper “flagman.”

In Hamilton, a similar controversy focusing on economic capital in relation to paid duty arrangements is occurring, but this time concerning a City bylaw that requires bar owners to pay for 10 paid duty officers for a public entertainment district during peak hours. Several owners have taken the city to court over this by-law’s legality, arguing they should not be required to exchange economic capital for body capital in this nodal linkage. Recently, Hamilton Police Service launched a review of its paid duty program as a consequence (O’Reilly, 2014); thus, political capital is being expended as a result of this controversy.

Social Capital and Political Capital in Windsor

As noted above, social capital exchanges are associated with police corruption. This is why paid duty policing became subject to scrutiny in Windsor in the mid-2000s by a City councillor and the head of a local business association. Local print media quoted several judges about paid duty that reflect the nature of this controversy:

“Police are in a unique position. ... When you put them in bars, what is their priority – duties to the bar or their overriding duties to the public?” His concerns were echoed by Ontario Court Justice Saul Nosanchuk and Carl Zalev, a former Superior Court judge. “When you work hand-in-glove with bars, you can get buddy-buddy with them; that’s going to lead to a lot of trouble,” said Zalev. ... No officer should be allowed to become “the darling of a particular bar” and should be rotated through different bars throughout the city every week, said Nosanchuk. ... “In a case where a bouncer is charged with using unreasonable force on a patron, would a paid-duty officer be more inclined to favour a bouncer just to please the bar owner?” asked Nosanchuk. “There’s a potential problem if they’re all paid by the owners” (Windsor Star, 2004, p. A1). As in Toronto, there was initial reluctance from both the police union and the police Chief to respond (Windsor Star, 2006). A study (McKaig, 2006) was commissioned by Windsor’s police services board leading to a new paid duty system that used random assignment to prevent businesses from choosing officers and, hence, officers from knowing clients. One user at a hospital recounted the following scenario:

At one time you could basically select who you wanted, and they thought ... a lot of police officers were getting too friendly with the people they were working with, especially some of the bars and ... they’ve really cut back on that now ... [If you want security, you submit a request and you get the officers that they assign. (User 11)

Previously, officers could “own” a user site (e.g., a bar or event) and thus would gain familiarity with it. They would know the regulars and what was expected to transpire there. The introduction of random assignments, which to our knowledge is used in many cities/regions in Ontario, can be seen as screening out this friendliness and familiarity (social capital), while allowing body capital to be freely exchanged for economic capital. Another user explained the lament for removal of social capital from these exchanges:
Prior to the implementation[,] ... there was usually a senior officer who assigned officers to serve as security. ... Many businesses seem to dislike this [new] system because of the lack of rapport this offers with the officers who are watching your business. ... Therefore, businesses are unable to get the police that they want and have become less likely to use paid duty officers. (User 14)

Yet this new system was resisted by a major retailer who lobbied the City and was granted an exemption from random assignment, precisely because he wanted the social capital that came with having repeat paid duty officers in his store, as reported in local print media: “He ... currently has about 15 officers who are familiar with his store and its security system who he utilizes to provide security. ... He said it takes about half an hour to train a new officer ... about its security systems” (Windsor Star, 2007, A3). This situation created the need for the City to exchange some political capital by implementing an exception for this retailer to the new requirement to randomly assign officers to particular sites.

Controversies over paid duty policing suggest that there can be a downside to attaining some forms of capital (Crossley, 2008), such as social capital when it is associated with corruption. Efforts to convert some forms of capital, such as body capital, can fail. These examples also show that in these local security networks, controversies are indexed to specific forms of capital, not to specific nodal linkages (in this case, paid duty) through which capital is exchanged.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This article makes a three-fold contribution to policing and security literatures. First, we make an empirical contribution by illuminating user pays policing as an overlooked nodal linkage in local security networks that involve various user types and by measuring the volumes of capital exchange. Second, we contribute to literature that deploys mixed methods in security network research. Consistent with Bourdieu’s instructions on research methods (Hamel, 1998), we demonstrate how several means of producing data, including FOI requests and interviews, but also quantitative approaches, can be deployed to explore a specific linkage involving capital exchange. Third, we make a conceptual contribution by extending a Bourdieusian framework and adjusting a key typology for understanding capital exchange to include body capital and to conceive of symbolic capital differently. We have applied Bourdieu’s framework to exchanges of capital in local security networks. This approach not only shows the usefulness of a Bourdieusian framework in criminal justice studies but also demonstrates how drawing from Bourdieu’s concepts enriches analysis of exchange and capital in overlapping literatures on security networks. The forms of capital help explain the controversies over paid duty policing in Canada. Our analysis shows the need to investigate nodal linkages in local security networks and underscores, too, that the volume of capital in networks can be studied by focusing on capital exchange. Changes in the governance of this linkage represent public police’s failure to convert forms of capital or failure to achieve symbolic capital. Future research must focus more closely, with more detailed research instruments than we used, on the forms of capital being exchanged by police and others.

In the context of debates about public police expansion, contraction, and the public good (Barker & Crawford, 2013; Millie, 2013), the foregoing raises several avenues for future research. First, future inquiries should pay closer attention to volume of capital exchanges in user pays policing and the nature of nodal linkages among public police and users using multiple or mixed research methods. Our study showed that not all user types are exchanging the same volumes of capital with public police in any given local network, and more research into the relationship between user type and kinds of capital being exchanged in other forms of user pays policing is overdue. It would seem that identifying volume and types of capital requires quantitative police data and analysis as well as qualitative methods such as interviews, respectively. Second, for public police, body capital is tethered to public legitimacy and therefore future research should include attention to this concept. Current research on police legitimacy tends to neglect attention to body capital (e.g., Antrobus, Bradford, Murphy, & Sargeant, 2015; Harkin, 2015) among officers when it may well be a factor that segments of the citizenry perceive.

More research is needed before we can determine whether user pays policing represents the de-institutionalization of public police’s historic capacity to convert body, cultural, and social capital into symbolic capital. It may be that other forms of capital in other user pays policing arrangements (of which paid duty is only one example; Ayling & Shearing, 2008; Loader, Goold, & Thumala, 2014), if present in sufficient volumes, are being effectively converted to symbolic capital by police. Third, when it is exchanged for economic capital in users’ profane environs (e.g., bars), it may mean police will have less body capital (as well as cultural capital) to invest in regular patrols and duties for the public good. The City of Toronto’s report noted, “Working extensive paid duty hours may interfere with regular police duties and work performance. ... [O]ur audit noted a number of
instances where officers undertook paid duty assignments which interfered with required court attendance” (Griffiths, 2011, p. 3). This is especially so if this economic capital continues to flow directly into private pockets of individual officers rather than into public police budgets where it could be spent on everything from enhanced training, to officers’ uniforms and other equipment, to new community policing initiatives. Our findings raise a question about whether use of capital in one social sphere means inevitably less availability for the public good. Fourth, research should explore what individual police officers obtain in paid duty policing and whether there is more that is exchanged in user pays transactions. For instance, officers may learn how to regulate new local contexts (e.g., a school event or a sporting event) due to particular paid duty assignments and thus receive cultural capital as well as economic capital. While our study revealed no evidence of this receipt, not even based on police administrators or departments’ own rationales for paid duty, future research on other nodal linkages involving public police and of user pays policing may yet reveal officers’ receipt of this form of capital.

Thus, there is a sense in which ‘user’ in user pays policing also refers to police officers themselves since there is an exchange of capital; one end of the link ‘uses’ the other for different reasons (Huey, 2008). Yet, the question of what forms and volumes of capital are received remains, hence the importance of examining specific uses and exchanges of capitals in local security networks. The issue is not so much ‘responsibilization’ in user pays policing, if that term is to be understood as one-way downloading of responsibility from the state to private actors for security,7 as what kind of responsibility (economic, moral, social) or capital is being transferred as well as how this might depend on user type. The acknowledgement of different forms of capital via Bourdieu troubles the easy application of the concept of ‘responsibilization.’

Our analysis indicates a need for more research into capital exchanges in security networks that includes attention to how convertibility of public police’s capital into symbolic capital fails. It is unclear whether the nodal link of user pays policing, like an old bridge spanning a river, can continue to be buttressed by spending political capital when it is stressed by failing capital conversions and the freighting of social capital with its burden of associated corruption.

References

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Endnotes

1 The proportion of user types and the regulation of these exchanges differ across Ontario regions/cities.

2 Sociologists studying networks have commented upon and devised ways of measuring the strength of ties within networks (Granovetter, 1982; Völker & Flap, 2001). However, this was not our focus in this study, which instead generated information pertaining to the kinds of capital and the volumes of capital being exchanged. We think volume of capital is an indicator of strength of ties (since it would seem the structures buttressing and/or serving as conduits for exchanges would need to be stronger to support larger volumes of capital than those handling lower volumes). We acknowledge that strength of ties is a more complex concept than merely measuring the volume of capital will reveal and thus avoid commenting on this aspect. The limited resources available for our exploratory study and the related difficulty of securing quality interview participants and information from reluctant police services to measure other aspects of strength of ties was beyond this study’s scope. Nonetheless, identifying the volume of capital being exchanged is important and lends insight into linkages in its own right irrespective of the strength ties.

3 By highlighting exchanges, we still assume police can dominate relations with users and that capital flows are not necessarily symmetrical across any particular police-user linkage (see also Huey, 2008, p. 210).
4 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for leading us to note this possibility. While we think they are distinctive, more qualitative empirical research into these forms should settle this issue.

5 Martin (2013) has explored what he calls force capital, defined as “the ability to deploy or threaten to deploy force across space” (p. 153). While an intriguing concept, we do not use this notion here because not all policing depends on force and some parts of Martin’s definition of force capital (e.g., communications, leadership) are already part of other aspects of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of capital.

6 The amount per officer working paid duty annually is likely much higher than $8,566 because many of the 3,047 officers paid the $26.1 million were the same officers.

7 Others have described more complex notions of ‘responsibilization’ that stem from the governmentality literature and that refer to responsibility for security as well as also other societal needs being downloaded from the state to private individuals (see, for example, Rose, 1999, pp. 174-5) or have critiqued this concept as simplistic because it avoids consideration of the perspectives of those upon whose shoulders responsibility is supposedly placed (see Lippert, 2006, pp. 170, 172).

8 Sizzle Koi restaurant was a regular user of paid duty in Hamilton. Its owners were engaged in an ongoing public relations battle with police and the City regarding paying for paid duty policing. They wrote a document describing their position on paid duty policing and posted it as a PDF on their website. The document was subsequently removed from the website, but remains on file with the authors of this article.